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There is a renewed interest in political science on how political risk affects multinational 
corporations operating in emerging markets.  Most existing studies suffer from data problems 
where researchers can only offer indirect evidence of the relationship between political 
institutions and political risk.  In this paper I utilize a new data resource to explore how domestic 
institutions affect political risks for multinationals.  Utilizing price data from political risk 
insurance agencies I test how domestic political institutions affect the premiums multinationals 
pay for coverage against 1) expropriations and contract disputes and 2) government restrictions 
on capital transactions.  I find that constraints on politicians lead to marginally lower 
expropriation and transfer risks.   Democracy, on the other hand, greatly reduces expropriation 
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There is resurgence in the academic literature on the link between political institutions 
and political risks facing multinational corporations.
1  One explanation for this recent interest in 
the study of political risk is that the risks multinationals face in emerging markets has changed 
over time, but academic research has failed to account for these changes.  Although the 1960s and 
1970s heralded waves of nationalizations, Kobrin (1984) argues that this period was unique and 
nationalization wasn’t common after 1975.
2  More recently, although the terrorist attacks on 9/11 
caused major damage to the insurance industry, the largest political risk insurance claims in 
history were made in the wake of the financial crisis that struck Argentina in 2002 as national and 
state governments broke contracts and restricted the capital transactions of foreign firms (Moran 
2003).  Multinationals may not face the same risks of outright nationalizations that they faced in 
the 1960s-1970s, but political risks still affect multinationals.        
In this paper I utilize both quantitative and qualitative research approaches to test the 
impact of political institutions on the levels of political risk facing multinationals in emerging 
markets.  Specifically, I utilize cross-sectional data from political risk insurance agencies to test 
how domestic political institutions affect political risks for multinational investors. I supplement 
this empirical analysis with qualitative interviews with multinational investors, investment 
                                                 
1 See Henisz (2000, 2002a, 2002b), Jensen (2002, 2003, 2006), and Li and Resnick 
(2003) for domestic institutions and FDI inflows.  See Correa and Kumar (2003) and 
Jensen (2003) for work on the role of international levels factors and political risk.  For 
work on the relationship between democratic institutions and sovereign borrowing see 
Schultz and Weingast (2003) and Saiegh (2005). 
2 See also Minor (1994).  See Kobrin (1980) for a breakdown of expropriations by 
sector. 
  2location consultants, and political risk insurances to justify assumptions I make in my statistical 
analysis and to further explore the micro-mechanisms of my argument.  Specifically, I focus on 
how political institutions affect the premiums multinationals pay for 1) political risk insurance for 
expropriation and contract disputes and 2) for risks associated with government restrictions on 
capital transactions.  I find that constraints on political actors (veto players) lower both types of 
political risks.  Democratic institutions, on the other hand, dramatically decrease the risk of 
expropriation and contract disputes, but it has no effect on transfer risks.   
2.  Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk 
Despite the growing consensus on the importance of attracting foreign direct investment 
and the shift in developing countries from hostility to FDI to country promotion to attract FDI, 
governments still enact policies that have direct and indirect negative effects on the profitability 
of multinational firms.  These risks have lead to the development of an industry dedicated to 
providing insurance covering political risks for multinational operations.  Political risk insurers 
charge premiums for political risk coverage against the confiscation of firms’ assets 
(expropriation risk), restricting the repatriation of profits or other capital transactions (transfer 
risk) or risks associated with war or civil disturbance (political violence risk).   
Using data from the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the 
U.S. government agency that provides investment insurance for U.S. firms, researchers at the 
World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA 2004) analyzed political risk 
insurance claims from 1971-2000.  They found that the period between 1971-1980 U.S. investors 
in emerging markets were exposed to both restrictions on transferring and repatriating funds 
(transfer risk) and were subject to a number of  expropriations.  The period of 1981-1990 saw an 
even larger increase in the number of transfer risks claims and major reductions in the number of 
  3expropriation claims.  The period of 1996-2000 continued to be a risky time for multinationals, 
where political violence and civil war claims increased dramatically.
3   
Although political violence risks have received a tremendous amount of attention 
recently, expropriation risk remains the catastrophic claim that is most damaging for firms.  The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development notes, “disputes on direct 
expropriation—mainly related to nationalization that marked the 70s and 80s—have been 
replaced by disputes related to foreign investment regulation and indirect expropriation” (OECD 
2004, 2).  Issues involving restrictions on capital transfers and civil war related events are more 
common in terms of the number of claims, but expropriation dominates in dollar terms.  Of all the 
dollars paid out by OPIC from 1970-1978, 96% of these claims were for expropriation.  From 
1991-2004, even after the major financial crises that triggered a number of transfer claims, 84% 
of the settlement amounts of OPIC claims were for expropriation.
4       
Although these complex forms of political risk vary over time, Vernon’s (1971) theory of 
“obsolescing bargaining” provides some insights into the relationship between nation-states and 
multinationals.  Multinationals operations are imperfectly mobile, where MNEs can invest 
anywhere in the world, but once an investment has been made there are serious costs to 
disinvesting.    Governments may openly expropriate assets (Kobrin 1979) or attempt to 
renegotiate contracts with multinationals after the investment has been made (Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988, Williamson 1996).
5  The potential for host governments to change policies after 
investment tempers MNEs location decisions. 
Even in countries with excellent records of contract enforcement, creeping expropriation 
plagues firms due to the difficulty of specifying complete contracts.  In technology joint-ventures, 
                                                 
3 Interview #6. 
4 See O’Sullivan (2004, 31). 
5 See Harms (2000) for a review of the political risk literature. 
  4for example, multinationals remain wary of how technological leakages or inadequate 
enforcement of property rights could threaten an investment.  These contracts, even if there are 
fully enforced, prove difficult to specify given the complexity of writing a contract about assets 
that have yet to be created and the uncertainty of the pace and scope of technological innovation 
(Freeman 1982, Mowery and Rosenberg 1989, Oxley 1997).  Also, writing contracts in the 
language of both the host and home country can be cumbersome, specifically in countries were 
lawyers play a minimal role in the drafting of contracts.  For example, in China, many joint-
venture contracts are extremely simple by Western standards due to the limited capacity of 
Chinese joint venture partners to translate and craft multiple language contractual agreements and 
the lack of delegation to international lawyers.
6
In other cases, issues arise between firms and local governments that are far from 
standard issues in investment contracts.  Was the Mexican government’s failure to renew the 
license of a foreign owned landfill site a breach of contract?
7  Does a firm deserve compensation 
when rebels in Liberia eat the inventory of a U.S. pig farm?
8  Who could have predicted that the 
Vietnamese government’s ban on foreign language advertising would also pertain to the logo on 
Pepsi beverage foundations, threatening Pepsi’s local beverage distribution network?
9     
                                                 
6 Interview #28. 
7  This is basic disputes in TECHMED v Mexico 2003 ICSID dispute.  The ICSID panel 
found that this failure to renew the license was an expropriation of the investment. 
8 Truth is sometimes stranger than fiction.  This is an actual OPIC claim where an 
investor, Keene Industries, had purchased OPIC political violence insurance and was paid 
a claim for this political event.  See O’Sullivan (2005). 
9 Interview #27. 
  5Many multinational investors have turned to international arbitration as one mechanism 
of minimizing disputes over unspecified elements of these contracts.  Bilateral investment treaties 
often give foreign investors the right to use international arbitration rather than utilize domestic 
courts and many multinational investors write arbitration clauses into joint venture contracts.  The 
major arbitration centers such as the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) and Singapore 
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) have seen dramatic increases in the use of arbitration 
over investment disputes in recent years.
10   
Although arbitration is often less costly than utilizing domestic courts, it does not 
eliminate political risk.  First, arbitration is generally seen as a last resort for investors and can 
have repercussions.  In Vietnam, for example, many businesses are wary of utilizing arbitration 
since this could offend the local and national government.
11  Arbitration may be an exit option, 
but it may not be a viable option for a firm that wants to continue doing business in a market.  
Second, governments may simply ignore arbitration awards.  Many of the high profile investment 
disputes over infrastructure projects involve governments not complying with arbitration awards. 
For some firms the mitigating of political risks is fairly straightforward.  These firms are 
in a unique position of sharing many of the same preferences as government officials.  Intel 
Corporation in Costa Rica is a major employer, a vehicle for technology transfer, and driver of 
economic growth in Costa Rica.  When the Costa Rican government proposed major tax changes, 
executives at Intel stressed that they would make their preferences know to government officials 
and that finding a common solution was in the best interest for everyone.
12  In Vietnam, Intel has 
                                                 
10 Interviews with ICSID, SIAC, and HKIAC, all confirm dramatic increases in the 
number of arbitration cases.  See interviews #4, #10, and #12. 
11 Interview #22. 
12 Interview #20. 
  6much more limited operations, focusing on providing local computer manufacturers with 
microchips and helping facilitate the spread of computer literacy into rural areas.
13  In both cases, 
Intel’s preferences align with that of the national and local governments, assuring market friendly 
policies.
14   
In other cases, firms have to resort to lobbying and influence over politicians.  Canadian 
aluminum manufacturer Alcan both directly lobbied the national government against proposed 
power prices increases in Brazil (for energy intensive smelting operations) and found support in 
the local aluminum manufacturing association.
15  By sharing preferences with local firms, 
multinationals can indirectly lobby governments for preferred policies. 
But for many multinationals, neither the government nor local firms share similar 
preferences as the multinational.  One industry that has been recently affected by major political 
events has been private investments in infrastructure.  Some projects have been directly 
expropriated, such as the government of Thailand’s seizure of a private expressway in 1993.  
Numerous other projects have been canceled after substantial initial investment, such as Enron’s 
Dabhol power plan in India and a major airport project in the Philippines.  Perhaps most 
damaging has been government renegotiating the pricing of power, electricity and water contracts 
after financial crises in Argentina, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines (See Moran 2003).   
According to a confidential interview with an international lawyer specializing in  
drafting private infrastructure contracts in Asia, investors were well aware of the risks of 
investing in these capital intensive, illiquid investments, but that investors attempted to write 
                                                 
13 Interview #25. 
14 Similarly, for Chubb, a major political risk insurer, investments that have major 
positive spillovers are perceived as being less likely a target of expropriation or transfer 
disputes.  Interview #8. 
15 Interview #17. 
  7complex contracts, often with international arbitration clauses.
16  In the end, many governments 
simple violated these agreements and either refused arbitration or ignored arbitration awards.  
Firms were aware of these political risks, but writing detailed contracts and relying on arbitration 
failed to protect their operations. 
3.  Political Institutions and Political Risk 
These enormous risks faced by multinational investors in emerging markets have lead to 
an important question.  What types of political institutions lower political risks for 
multinationals?  One vein of the literature focuses on how checks on political actors affect the 
operations and investment decisions of multinational investors.  Political institutions that reduce 
the ability of politicians to change government policy can reduce political risks for 
multinationals.
17   
In a series of papers Henisz and co-authors find that multinationals are responsive to the 
level of constraints on politicians.
18  Multinationals’ decisions to enter emerging markets and 
                                                 
16 Interview #26. 
17 One existing measure of these checks is a variable constructed by Beck et al. (2001) 
which counts the number of independent veto players in a country.  Alternatively, Henisz 
(2000, 2002a) constructs a new measure of political constraints.  This variable, similar to 
the Beck et al. measure, attempts to capture the number of political constraints that affect 
policy change.  Henisz measures how the number of formal checks affects the policy 
process (veto players) by taking into account the decreasing marginal impact of added 
veto players and the policy preferences of each veto player.   
18 For work on the relationship between political constraints and infrastructure investment 
see Henisz and Zelner (2001) and Henisz (2002b) 
  8their entrance strategies are colored by the level of political constraints.  Henisz (2004) also finds 
that these political constraints are associated with higher levels of fiscal policy volatility.
19   
Arguments linking veto players and FDI are problematic in that policy stability is a 
double-edged sword.  Countries with excellent policies towards FDI can credibly commit to a 
good investment environment, while countries with poor policies towards FDI can be locked into 
a set of policies that will deter investment.  Jensen (2006) argues that veto players will not 
necessarily increase FDI inflows, but they will lead to policy stability, reducing political risks for 
multinational investors.  Utilizing political risk insurance data we can directly test the impact of 
veto players on the reduction of political risks, without confounding the affects of veto players on 
other policies that may be positive or negative for multinationals. 
Hypothesis 1:  Political constraints will reduce expropriation risk. 
Another set of papers have focused on the role of democratic institutions in affecting FDI 
inflows (Jensen 2003, Li and Resnick 2003).
20  First, as highlighted above, democratic regimes 
have more veto players than non-democratic regimes both formally in the number of veto players 
and in their effective number of political constraints.  Democratic institutions provide a status quo 
bias in policy, reducing the ability of leaders to enact sweeping policy changes that could harm 
multinationals.   A number of political risk insurers, location consultants, and international 
lawyers argue that this is a major advantage of investing in democracies.
21   
Second, democratic institutions provide formal avenues for lobbying of politicians.  In 
most cases, private sector actors can influence policy decisions in democratic regimes.  Some 
                                                 
19 Frye (2005) makes a similar argument on the impact of political polarization on 
investors’ expectations of future economic policies. 
20 Democratic institutions are associated with protect property protections and stronger 
contract enforcement (Olson 1993, 2000, North and Weingast 1989, Bates 2001).    
21 Interviews #15, #16, #19, and #21. 
  9authoritarian regimes have also generated institutional mechanisms for multinationals to lobby 
the government for policy change.  For example, in Singapore, the Economic Development Board 
regularly solicits opinions on proposed legal changes from multinationals and lobbies for 
preferred policies on behalf of the firms.
22  Unfortunately, I don’t know of any existing datasets 
that directly measure the strength of private sector actors in authoritarian or democratic regimes. 
Finally, as argued by Jensen (2003, 2006), democratic leaders can suffer audience costs 
by reneging on international agreements.  For example, investors can play a Grimm-Trigger 
strategy where once a politician has expropriated from an investor, foreign investors refuse to 
invest until the executive is removed.
23  This strategy can be played on both democratic and 
authoritarian leaders.  Both authoritarian and democratic leaders suffer reputation costs for 
reneging on contacts, but in democracies voters have the ability and incentive to punish leaders 
with tarnished reputations at the polls.  Thus political leaders in democratic countries will uphold 
property rights, not because of constraints or even the relationship between democracy and the 
rule of law, but democratic leaders will be wary of generating an unfavorable reputation in 
international markets.
24   
It is important to point out that this audience cost argument is based on two assumptions.  
First, financial markets will punish elected officials for reneging on contacts with multinationals, 
rather than simply punish the country.  Although no studies have directly tested this argument in 
relation to multinational investment and elected officials, there is considerable evidence that 
financial markets respond and react to the probability of individual leaders being elected in 
                                                 
22 Interview #24.  Vietnam is also an interesting case of an authoritarian regime that 
allows feedback from firms on proposed legislative change.  Interview #23. 
23 McGillivray and Smith (2004) 
24 For an empirical analysis of the relationship between media openness and international 
disputes see Choi and James (Forthcoming). 
  10democratic systems.
25  As the recent 2002 Presidential election in Brazil and the 2004 
parliamentary election in India illustrate, the reputation of individual leaders in international 
financial markets affects policy, cabinet appointments, and even who is selected as Prime 
Minister.
26  Obviously both country level and individual level factors matter, but voters, at the 
time of election, have the ability to choose between officials with varying levels reputation in 
financial markets. 
A second assumption is that voters will punish politicians for this backlash from financial 
markets.  Can’t politicians use the proceeds from these disputes to buy off voters?  In some cases, 
such as the major expropriations of oil and mining in the 1960s and 1970s, and possibility a 
number of major infrastructure disputes in the last ten years, expropriations and contact disputes 
could entail a major redistribution to the median voters and be political popular.  But, with the 
majority of foreign direct investment flowing to developing countries being manufacturing and 
service sector FDI, it is unclear if a major expropriation of a manufacturing facility that is a parts 
supplier for the automobile industry or textiles dedicated for a specific supplier, is valuable for 
voters if firms can cut expropriated facilities off from supplies and final markets.  According to 
Kobrin (1984) by the mid-1970s, many of the industries that had the highest value for firms 
(mining, oil, etc) had already been expropriated or governments had built the capacity to regulate 
                                                 
25 For just a small selection of the vast amount of work on the responses of financial 
markets to domestic politics see, Bernhard and Leblang (2002a, 2002b, 2006), Freeman 
et al (2000), Herron et al (1999), Herron (2000), Leblang (2002), Leblang and Bernhard 
(2000), Leblang and Mukerjee (2004), and McGillivray (2003, 2004). 
26 In Brazil this lead to the revolutionary Lula nominated a relatively conservative cabinet 
and in India the nomination of the relatively conservative former Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh being installed as Prime Minister over Sonia Ghandi. 
  11firms in ways that were more beneficial than expropriation.  Most governments are attempting to 
sell government assets (privatization) not reassert control over firms via ownership.
27  In many 
cases the reasons foreign investors entered many of these industries was because governments 
privatized inefficient enterprises that were a net drain on government resources.  Although little 
work has been done in quantifying the net impact of major contract disputes on citizens, it is 
difficult to come up with many cases of expropriations or contact disputes that had a net positive 
impact on the median voter.
28   
More importantly, even if these net benefits of expropriation outweigh the future losses 
of inward FDI, voters still have the incentive to remove politicians with tarnished reputations.  
Thus expropriations or contract disputes that are ex ante popular can still lead to democratic 
backlashes for elected officials.  Rational voters will support an expropriation, but then replace 
the lead with the tarnished reputation in the next electoral cycle.  If voters lack the ability to 
credibly commit to reelecting a politician after reneging on a contact, in equilibrium we would 
expect that democratic leaders would refuse to renege on a contact.
29  Thus, even though 
expropriation entails redistribution from firms to voters, if markets punish individual leaders for 
reneging on contracts, we should expect no expropriations. 
Obviously, this argument is a generalization of the relationship between financial 
markets, voters and elected politicians.  There are some exceptional cases of governments 
renegotiating contracts that clearly favor the median voters, but my argument is that the net 
impact of democratic institutions is in restraining politicians from making decisions that would 
                                                 
27 Kobrin (1984) argues that the increasing regulatory capacity of developing countries 
makes regulation a more viable option than expropriation. 
28 See O’Sullivan (2003) for a list of OPIC claims. 
29 See Hershman (2005) 
  12harm their reputations in financial markets and voters have the incentive to elect politicians with 
good reputations.  This leads to my second hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2:  Democracy will reduce expropriation risk. 
  The existing literature linking political institutions and political risks has focused on 
issues of expropriation risk, but they have failed to account for the increased risks caused by 
currency inconvertibility, capital controls, or other sudden changes in the ability of firms to 
repatriate profits or transfer capital abroad.  Although in many ways this is similar to 
expropriation risk, where governments renege on contracts assuring convertibility, there is one 
major difference in these types of risks.  Transfer risks emerge, in most cases, during periods of 
financial crisis. 
  To be clear, this risk is separate from a currency crises or devaluation.  Sovereign 
governments control their own monetary policy, but multinational corporations often sign very 
specific agreements maintaining the right to hold financial assets in a strong currency (usually 
banks holding reserves in dollars or Euros) or collect fees either in directly in a strong currency or 
indirectly through a agreed upon exchange rate (for example, infrastructure projects charging for 
service in dollars).  When governments convert a firm’s savings into the local currency in 
violation of a contract or refuse to honor agreed upon prices and instead pays for services in 
devalued local currency this is transfer risk.  These risks emerge when governments break 
contracts during a financial crisis.   
I argue that during periods of financial crisis political constraints could be valuable for 
minimizing transfer risks.  Political constraints limit the ability of politicians to swiftly enact 
policies that will restrict multinationals ability to restrict capital flows.  
Hypothesis 3:  Checks on government will reduce transfer risk. 
Alternatively, democratic institutions are not a panacea for attracting international capital.  
One possible objection is that democratic institutions may lead to greater demands for 
redistribution.  If politicians can increase their probability of maintaining power by expropriation 
  13or breaching contracts during a financial crisis, democratic institutions could increase risks for 
multinationals.  I argue that under most circumstances, democratic institutions will reduce risk for 
multinational investors, but under periods of serious financial crisis, democratic institutions may 
fail to protect multinationals’ investments.   
One illustrative example is Argentina’s changing risk environment for multinationals.  In 
the 1990s Argentina was a relatively open economy in terms of foreign direct investment.  FDI 
promotion became a central goal of both the national and subnational governments.  Politicians 
generally upheld contracts, provided property rights protections to foreign firms, and gave firms 
access to domestic means of contract adjudication.  Argentina provided multinationals with a 
relatively low risk environment for their investments. 
  The investment environment changed dramatically during the financial crisis of 2001-
2002.  Although the Argentinean government didn’t arbitrarily nationalize foreign industries or 
break all contracts with foreign firms, the government engaged in a form of “creeping 
expropriation” by restricting capital transactions and engaging in the “Pesoification” of contracts 
and financial assets.  Foreign firms couldn’t engage in capital flight, had funds forcible converted 
into Pesos, and many contracts, especially in infrastructure, were rewritten or canceled.
30
The Argentinean case isn’t unique.  This role of financial crisis in changing FDI policy is 
recognized by political risk insurers and other practitioners.  According to According to Ikawa 
(2004) in an introduction to a volume on political risk and the political risk insurance industry:  
Economic crises appear to be pushing pro-FDI governments into taking a course that may 
cause expropriation, inconvertibility, or break of contract/contract frustration claims….In 
this sense, political risks are become more economic events rather than purely concerned 
with the political will of the host country. 
 
                                                 
30 Details on these contract disputes can be found in Moran (2003) and through the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes website. 
  14  Why do democratic governments engage in activities that harm multinational firms, and 
thus damage the politician’s reputation in international markets?  My central argument is that the 
costs of expropriating (in terms of reputation) are greatly decreased during a financial crisis.  For 
example, did the act of Pesoification really tarnish the government’s reputation any more than the 
financial crisis itself?  The key point is that the marginal impact on an incumbent’s reputation of a 
contract dispute is much smaller during a financial crisis.  Thus politicians in democratic regimes, 
normally concerned with their reputation in international markets, are less sensitive to the 
reputation effects of breaking contracts during a financial crisis.
31   
Hypothesis 4:  Democracy will have no impact on transfer risks. 
  In the following section I will argue that political risk insurance data is the most 
appropriate data resource to test these four hypotheses.  
4.  Utilizing Political Risk Insurance Data 
A large and complex insurance industry has emerged to help multinationals mitigate 
political risk by purchasing insurance contracts.  These providers of this political risk insurance 
include private market participants, including Sovereign, Zurich, Chubb, Lloyd’s of London, Aon 
and AIG and government agencies such as OPIC, Export Development Canada, and a slew of 
newly privatized Export Credit Agencies.
32
                                                 
31 Also, during a financial crisis we would expect redistribution from investors to 
domestic citizens to have the largest marginal political impact.  In a period when 
individual incomes and real savings plummet, a small transfer from investors to citizens 
can have a large political benefit.  We would expect that democracies, with already 
tarnished reputations, and with large marginal benefits to redistribution, to engage in 
activities that increase transfer risk. 
32 Interview #9. 
  15All of these organizations offer political risk insurance for multinational investors.  This 
insurance is distinct from other types of property insurance, where these contracts are designed to 
insure against political events that affect, large, illiquid investment projects.  Specifically, the 
political risk insurance industry categorizes these political risks into three broad categories.
33   
1.  War and Political Violence 
2.  Expropriation/Breach of Contract 
3.  Transfers Risk/Inconvertibility. 
War and political violence risks are associated with the direct or indirect impacts of 
political violence, such as civil war, uprisings, or some types of terrorist attacks.  This political 
violence can be directly targeted at the firm, or the level of political violence in the country can 
make multinational operations unprofitable.
34   The second type of risk, expropriation risk, covers 
direct nationalization and expropriation of assets.  Breach of contract covers a government’s 
failure to fulfill the terms of a contract, and some types of government policy changes that affect 
income streams and profitability.  Finally, transfer risk encompasses the risk of governments 
restricting capital flows in ways that harm multinational corporations, usually during a financial 
crisis.   
One of the largest providers of political risk insurance to emerging markets is the World 
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
35  MIGA’s mandate is to provide 
investment insurance and investment promotion to developing countries.  From 1990-2000 MIGA 
                                                 
 
33Some organizations such as MIGA use four categories, while others such at EDC lump 
expropriation and breach of contract into the same category. 
34 I leave an exploration of the determinants of political violence premiums for future 
research. 
35 See Hansen (2004) for a brief overview and history of MIGA and OPIC. 
  16has issued 473 “Guarantees” totaling $7.1 billion (West and Tarazona 2001).  These guarantees 
helped facilitate $36 billion in FDI to some of the highest risk countries.   
Another major provider is the U.S. Governments’ Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation.  In 2004 alone, OPIC provided political risk insurance for 72 projects in 42 
countries, including infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, construction in Iraq, hotels in 
Uzbekistan, energy investments in Botswana, silver mining in Bolivia, and telecommunications in 
Brazil (OPIC 2004).  OPIC investments have been subject to a number of political acts that have 
affected OPIC insured investments.   Since 1971, OPIC has paid 271 claims totaling $914.7 
million (O’Sullivan 2005, 49). In some cases these are claims based on nation-wide 
expropriations, such as claims of expropriated U.S. investments in Iran and Vietnam in the 1970s.  
In other cases, OPIC paid claims for single event, some as major as a $217 million expropriation 
claim by MidAmerican Energy Holdings against the government of Indonesia (O’Sullivan 2005).   
Risk insurers, both public and private, have paid major claims in recent years.  Just in the 
power sector alone, major claims have been made on the imposition of capital controls in 
Argentina, cancellation of power projects in India and Indonesia, and investment disputes in 
Venezuela and China (Martin 2004).  These losses in the political risk insurance industry dwarf 
the insurance claims made from the events on 9/11. 
Although I believe that these political risk insurance are most relevant for large, illiquid 
investments such as investments mining, oil and infrastructure the types of firms purchasing this 
insurance is quiet heterogeneous.  A survey of past OPIC claims finds that firms purchased risk 
insurance and brought claims to OPIC in a number of industries including services, 
manufacturing, banking, and agriculture.  Of the 279 OPIC claims from 1971-2004 only 30 
claims were from extractive industries and 10 from infrastructure investments (O’Sullivan 2003).   
Unfortunately for multinationals, political risk insurance is far from a panacea for 
eliminating political risks.  Risk insurance does not cover all types of political risk, and coverage 
  17is expensive.
36  For example, “MIGA prices to risk, and premium rates are decided on a per 
project basis, usually ranging between 30 and 100 basis points per risk (up to 150 in some cases) 
per year” (MIGA 2004a, 5).  Also, most coverage requires the multinational to “walk away” from 
their investment.  For example, Canada’s political risk insurance agency, Export Development 
Canada (EDC), requires that for a country to claim their coverage they must turn over control of 
the assets to the EDC.  In cases where multinationals are severely damaged by a government 
policy change, they are often forced to either make due with situation or to write off the whole 
investment.  Finally, most organizations require the investors bear at least some of the risk, where 
OPIC, for example, covers a maximum of 90% of the investment. 
Political risk insurance doesn’t completely insulate firms from political risk, but it does 
provide useful data on the premiums charged for risk insurance coverage in different countries.  
Although political risk insurance industry remains far less quantitative than other part of the 
insurance industry, many firms utilize country rating data for both the pricing of political risk and 
financial institutions to manage their country risk exposure.  Country risk ratings are a tool used 
by industry professional to measure political risks.
37   
Utilizing this political risk insurance data has a number of distinct advantages over 
previous studies.  First, political risk insurance data allows us to isolate political risk from other 
                                                 
36 A study commissioned by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that the cost 
of political risk insurance coverage was one of the major reasons why most firms don’t 
purchase political risk insurance coverage.  (Hamdani, Liebers and Zanjani 2005).  An 
interview with an OPIC representative stressed that much of the political risk insurance 
coverage is essentially the same product used 50 years ago and it doesn’t appropriately 
cover a number of important risks faced by multinationals.   
37 Interview #8, #11, #14, and #18. 
  18components of firms’ investment strategies.  Most scholars attempt to explain political risk by the 
level for foreign direct investment flows or the type of entrance strategy utilized by 
multinationals.
38  Political risk insurance data is a direct measure of political risk.
39   
Second, political insurance coverage is purchased for specific types of political risk 
(Violence, Expropriation, and Transfer Risk).  Utilizing political risk insurance data allows us to 
differentiate the impact of political institutions on specific categories of risk.  This allows 
researchers to go farther in specifying the specific types of risks that affect firms.   
Third, these measures are built by market actors attempting to maximize profits by 
properly pricing and allocating political risk.  Although these measures aren’t generated in a 
market the same way stocks prices are determined through trading since the pricing of political 
risk contracts are confidential; the political risk insurance industry has a number of feedback 
                                                 
38 This approach provides a number of benefits over existing empirical analyses.  The 
existing studies of political risk have focused on nationalization and expropriations 
(Kobrin 1980, Minor 1994), the entry decisions of multinationals (Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988, Murtha 1991, Oxley 1997, and Henisz 2000, 2002a) or flows of foreign 
direct investment (Oneal 1994, Wei 2000, Resnick 2001, Jensen 2003, Li and Resnick 
2003).  Although this is reasonable, this is far from a direct test of the causal link between 
politics and risk.  A better measure of risk is necessary to test these theoretical arguments. 
39 Another strategy to explore the micro-factors that influence investor decisions is to 
focus on surveys of multinational decision makers to explore which sets of political risks 
affect firms and to rate countries on these specific risks.   These surveys suffer from a 
number of shortcomings.  First, these surveys don’t directly ask multinationals about the 
link between political institutions.  Second, these survey’s are limited in country coverage 
and do not provide a historical time-series.    
  19mechanisms that allow for price convergence across insurers.  Political risk insurers 
(underwriters) develop political risk contracts and utilize brokers to interface with clients.
40  
These brokers convey information about competitors pricing to underwriters.     
  I contacted a number of government agencies, private risk insurance providers, and 
investment location consultants.  The data presented in this study comes from ONDD, the Belgian 
Export Credit Agency.  I choose this data for five reasons.  First, ONDD makes this data publicly 
available via their website.
41  Second, this data is disaggregated by type of political risk insurance 
(expropriation/breach of contract risk, transfer risk, and war/political violence risk).  Third, after 
interviewing plant location consultants I found that this specific political risk insurance data is 
utilized for evaluating risks (and protecting against risk).  One of the largest multinational 
investment location consultancies, IBM-Plant Location International uses this specific data to 
evaluate political risks.  Even if firms do not purchase ONDD political risk insurance, major 
investment location consultants utilize their data for investment decisions.  Fourth, interviews 
with political risk insurance brokers reveals price convergence across agencies.
42  This is due to 
feedback mechanisms where brokers report to insurance underwriters if their prices for insurance 
contracts are out of line with other underwriters.  The ONDD prices are representative of prices 
for similar contracts from other agencies.  Finally, the head of the ONDD also serves as the head 
of the OECD’s country rating service and is the price leader in export credit insurance.
43    
ONDD categorizes countries into seven risk groups.  Countries with the highest risks are 
coded 7 and countries with the lowest risk are coded 1.  Countries received separate scores for 
                                                 
40 Interview #7 and #11.  
41 www.ducroire.be 
42 Interview #7 and #14. 
43 The OECD ratings serve as a price floor for export credit insurance pricing. 
  20expropriation risk, transfer risk, and war risk.  For the reminder of this paper I focus on 
expropriation and transfer risk.  
Insert Table 1 
  A number of interesting patterns emerge from the data.  First, few countries are clustered 
in the low risk or high risk categories.  Only 23 of the 153 countries achieve the lowest risk score 
for both types of risk coverage.  These countries are the usual suspects of advanced democracies, 
plus the wealthy authoritarian state Singapore. Only Iraq, Somalia, and Zimbabwe achieve the 
highest risk rating of 7. 
  Although these two measures of political risk are correlated at 0.79, a number of 
countries vary dramatically in the differences in their ratings on these two types of coverage.  
Countries that have experienced financial crisis have substantially higher transfer risk ratings than 
expropriation ratings.  Surprisingly, other countries that have not experienced financial crisis also 
have much higher transfer risk ratings than expropriation/breach of contract ratings.  EU 
accession countries Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Slovak Republic all have the 
lowest possible risk rating in terms of expropriation risk (1) but have much higher transfer risk 
ratings (3). 
Although most countries were rated as less risky in terms of expropriation risk than 
transfer risk, a small set of mostly authoritarian regimes had lower transfer risks.  Brunei, China, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates score a 2’s in terms of transfer 
risk, but are scored as 3 in terms of expropriation risk.  Algeria and Iran, two countries that are 
very risky in terms of expropriation (scores of 5 and 6) are both scored below the mean in terms 
of transfer risk (3).  
  What explains these complex patterns of political risk?  I argue that political institutions, 
specifically political constraints and the level of democracy are the key independent variables.  
As highlighted earlier I focus on the relationship between democracy, political constraints, and 
political risk.  Although measures of democracy and the level of executive constraints are highly 
  21correlated (0.76) not all democracies have high levels of executive constraints and not all 
authoritarian regimes are relatively unconstrained.  In Table 2 I categorize all countries into four 
groups of democracy and executive constraints. 
Insert Table 2 
  In the lower right hand box are 61 unsurprising countries that exhibit high levels of 
democracy and a high score on the number of executive constraints category.
44  This group 
contains most OECD countries and many middle income countries.  At the other extreme, are the 
low democracy, low constraint countries which include Angola, Bahrain, and Cuba. 
  A total of 28 countries, or slightly over 18% of our observations, do not fall into either 
simple category.  Ten countries, strange bedfellows such as Botswana, Mongolia, and 
Switzerland, exhibit high levels of democracy and low levels of executive constraints.  Eighteen 
countries fall into the other category of low levels of democracy and high levels of executive 
constraints.  How do these rough categories of democracy and political constraints relate to the 
existing measures of political risk?  In Table 3 I present a two by two table that presents that 
average expropriation and transfer risk score for each of the four boxes.   
Insert Table 3 
This brief snapshot is informative, but the goal of this project is to build a theoretically informed 
empirical test of the determinants of expropriation risk and transfer risk.  To accomplish this I 
build two Ordered Probit models utilizing the cross-sectional political risk data.    
One serious concern is the high levels of multicolinearity between the measures of  
political constraints and the level of democracy.  Multicolinearity doesn’t violate any statistical 
assumptions, but it does cause problems in estimation by inflating the standard errors.  To 
                                                 
44 I use the standard 17 point Polity score for the cut off between high democracy and low 
democracy.  For political constraints I classify countries above the mean level of political 
constraints as high, and at or the below the mean as low. 
  22minimize the problems associated with multicolinearity I test relatively simple models of the 
determinants of political risk to maximize the sample size.   
  A second concern is that, on the surface, this cross-sectional data does not allow us to test 
the important causal mechanisms linking democracy and political constraints to expropriation and 
transfer risks.  A dynamic tests using data that varies over time can test if political risks increase 
prior to democratic elections or  
  This concern misses the important decision calculus of multinationals and fails to 
recognize the complexity of political risk insurance pricing.  Multinational investors are not 
purchasing coverage to cover events surround an upcoming election or a political event in the 
next year; they are purchasing insurance products that offer coverage for political events over the 
next 15 years.  While the risk of an actual expropriation or transfer restriction varies across time, 
multinationals are attempting to evaluate the probability of these investments occurring over a 
long time horizon.   
  Interviews with political risk insurers highlight these concerns.  Insurers must price 
coverage for events that could happen anytime during the next 15 years.  For most insurers, 
political risk insurance prices do not vary dramatically over time.  The ONDD’s political risk 
ratings have varied little over time, and the Japanese political risk insurance agency (NEXI) has 
not changed their price ratings since the inception of their current rating system in 1996, covering 
overall country risk.  This may be shocking to many scholars observing the waves of financial 
crises and contract disputes since the late 1990s, but to political risk insurers, many of the 
countries with major contract disputes were rated as risky investment locations well before the 
late 1990s. 
  In summary, political risk insurance data provides an accurate picture of the long-run risk 
environment for most countries.  This cross-sectional data should be interpreted as the pricing for 
probability of specific types of political events within the next 15 years.   
  23For the model on the determinants of expropriation risk I utilize a set of controls from the 
literature on the determinants of expropriations.   
•  Level of Development (GDPPC): Higher levels of economic development are associated 
with lower levels of expropriation and contract disputes.
45 
•  Economic Growth (Growth):  According to Jodice (1980, 192), “Expropriation is a 
reasonable response to economic discontent which is directly linked to the operations of 
foreign firms in the national economy.”  In periods of low economic growth, politicians 
have the incentive to redistribute income from foreigners to domestic citizens.
46 
•  Foreign Aid (Aid):  Countries dependent on foreign aid are less likely to expropriate from 
foreign investors (Jodice 1980).  
  To model the determinants of transfer restrictions, I include measures that control for the 
probability of a country being in a financial crisis.  A vast literature in economics has built 
empirical models of currency crisis.
47   
•  Level of Development (GDPPC):  Countries with higher levels of economic development 
are less likely to experience financial crises (Kumar et al 2003) 
•  Economic Growth (Growth):  In period of low economic growth, politicians have the 
incentive to redistribute income from foreigners to domestic citizens.  Periods of low 
economic growth are also strong predictors of financial crisis.  (Frankel and Rose 1996) 
                                                 
45 Jodice (1980) argues that more advanced economies are more likely to expropriate due 
to administrative capacity necessary to administer expropriated investments, but finds no 
empirical support for this argument. 
46 See also Bunn and Mustafaoglu (1978). 
47 See Kaminsky et al (1998) for a review of the literature. 
  24•  Present Value of Debt (Debt):  Higher levels of debt are associated with a higher 
probability of financial crisis.  (Frankel and Rose 1996). 
•  Foreign Aid (Aid):  Countries dependent on foreign aid are less likely to expropriate from 
foreign investors.   
•  Central Bank Reserves (Reserves):  Low levels of central bank reserves are both a 
symptom and a predictor of future financial crises (Frankel and Rose 1996, Kaminsky et 
al 1998). 
My two key independent variables are Political Constraints and Democracy.   
Henisz (2002) provides data on political constraints.
48   To measure the level of democracy I 
utilize the standard measure of democracy from the Polity IV dataset.  Political constraints are a 
continuous variable ranging from 0 to 0.72.  Democracy is an ordinal variable from 0 (low 
democracy) to 20 (highest democracy score).  
Table 4:  Determinants of Expropriation Risk 
Table 5:  Predicted Values 
In Table 4 I present the results of a series of Ordered Probit model for 128 countries  
on the determinants of expropriation and breach of contract insurance premiums in models 1-3, 
and the results excluding the 28 OECD countries in the sample in models 4-6.  As expected, 
higher levels of GDP per capita and dependence on foreign aid are associated with lower levels of 
risk.  When estimated individually, both the level of democracy and the number of political 
constraints are highly statistically significant predictors of the level of political risk.  These 
variables are insignificant when estimated at the same time due to issues of multicolinearity, 
although they are jointly significant at the 0.05 level.   In Table 5 I present the estimated change 
in predicted values for each category of political risk.
49  In the first column I estimate the 
                                                 
48 I utilize his measure Political Constraints III.   
49 I utilize Clarify for all predicted values.  See King et al (2000) and Tomz et al (2003).   
  25predicted change in a move from the minimum value of political regimes (0) to a mean value 
(13.18) and in the second column a move from the mean value (13.18) to the maximum 
democracy score (20).  Clearly, both the level of democracy and political constraints has a 
dramatic impact on political risk ratings. 
  I perform a parallel test on the determinants of transfer risk.  I utilize a similar set of 
control variables and I include measures of the present value of debt and the level of foreign 
exchange reserves to control for the economic conditions associated with financial crisis.  
Including reserves as a variable reduces my sample size to 82 countries, removing a number of 
countries with less transparent government finances (reserves) such as Iran and North Korea, and 
a number of very small countries that do not report detailed information on foreign exchange 
reserves.  Including a measure of the present value of debt also reduces the sample size due to a 
number of OECD countries not providing detailed debt data to the World Bank.  I estimated all 
models without this reserve and debt variable on the full sample of 128 and 100 countries.  My 
results on my two key variables of interest are unchanged. 
Table 6:  Determinants of Transfer Risk 
Table 7: Predicted Values 
  In Table 6 I present the results of 6 models on the determinants of transfer risk.  As 
expected, higher levels of GDP per capital are associated with lower levels of transfer risk.  
Contrary to earlier estimates, higher levels of economic growth and lower levels of foreign aid are 
associated with lower levels of transfer risk.  I hesitate from reading too much into these results 
due to the fact that low growth and high inflows of foreign aid (including aid from multilateral 
institutions) could be the symptoms of a financial crisis, and not a causal determinant of transfer 
risk.  Other predictors of financial crisis, such as high levels of debt and low levels of foreign 
exchange reserves are also associated with higher transfer risk. 
  The two key independent variables, democracy and political constraints, diverge in their 
impact on transfer risk.  Political constraints, similar to earlier estimates, are associated with 
  26lower levels of transfer risk (models 8 and 11).  Democracy, on the other hand is not a statistically 
significant predictor of the level of transfer risk (models 7 and 10).  When both variables are 
included in the same regression, political constraints remains a statistically significant 
determinant of political risk and the coefficient increases dramatically.  Democracy on the other 
hand, has a positive coefficient, although it fails to achieve conventional levels of statistical 
significance.   
  In Table 7 I present the predicted values from changes in the level of democracy and 
political constraints.  Both the level of democracy and the level of political constraints have a 
modest impact on the level of transfer risk.  As recalled from Table 5, democracy is not a 
statistically significant predictor of transfer risks, and in these simulations, none of the estimates 
on the marginal impact of democracy is significant at the 90% level.  Alternatively, political 
constraints are statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) in model 8 and in these simulations. 
5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper I argue that political constraints do provide stability in policy and protect 
multinationals from government policy changes that will harm their operations or threaten their 
assets.  Alternatively, I argue that the impact of democratic institutions on political risk is 
conditional on the economic performance.  In periods of “normal” economic performance, 
democracy protects property rights by generating audience costs for political leaders that 
expropriate, renege, or harm multinational investments.  Alternatively, in periods of financial 
crisis, politicians with already tarnished reputations have strong demands for redistribution and 
have small marginal costs to their reputation.  It is during these periods when the risk reducing 
properties of democracy are weakest and the incentives for politicians to exploit multinationals 
are strongest.  
In this study I test this theory utilizing a unique data set on the prices charged for political 
risk insurance and supplement this empirical analysis with qualitative data from 28 interviews.  
My findings point to some important differences between the relationship between both 
  27institutional measures of risk and the types of risks faced by multinationals.  Although democracy 
and political constraints both reduce the risk of expropriation and breach of contracts, these two 
related by conceptually distinct institutional arguments have different impacts on the level of 
transfer risk.  Political constraints greatly reduce transfer risk, while democratic institutions have 
no impact on the level of transfer risk.      
  This paper provides an avenue for future research on the relationship between political 
institutions and political risks.  By focusing on market based measures of political risk that are 
disaggregated by the type of risk, scholars can more appropriately test existing theories on how 
domestic political institutions can reduce political risks for foreign investors.  These results also 
provide some insights in the empirical puzzle on how a number of pro-FDI governments have 
recently seen a wave of contract disputes between governments and foreign investors.  
Governments that have not been associated with contract disputes in the past have reneged on 
contracts with foreign investors during times of financial crisis.  It is during these times when we 
see a divergence on the impact of political constraints on one hand and role of reputation costs on 
the other in their ability to constrain governments from engaging in activities that harm 
multinational investors. 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Total 
1  23  6  10       39 
2   2  6  5  2   15 
3    6 5 3 4 1 5  24 
4      3 4 9  13  11  40 
5      1 1 4 4  12  22 
6     1      2  7  10 
7         3  3 
Total  23 14 26 13 17 22 38  153 
Note:  Numbers indicate the number of countries contained in each cell according to their ONDD 
country risk ratings. 
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Table 2:  Democracy and Political Constraints 
 
  Low Constraints (0-0.25)  High Constraints(0.25-0.71) 
Low Democracy (0-16)  63 Countries  18 Countries 
Algeria (7, 0.42)  
Bangladesh (16, 0.39)  
CAR (15, 0.51)  
Ecuador (16, 0.55) 
Estonia (16, 0.55)  
Fiji (15, 0.46)  
Georgia (15, 0.33) 
Ghana (16, 0.31)  
Iran (13, 0.35)  
Malawi (15, 0.42)  
Malaysia (13, 0.54)  
Mozambique (16, 0.33)  
Namibia (16, 0.27)  
Nepal (6, 0.39)  
Nigeria (14, 0.39)  
Sri Lanka (16, 0.41)  
Uganda (6, 0.33)  
Zimbabwe (3, 0.34) 
High Democracy (17-20)  10 Countries 
Botswana (19, 0.10)  
Brazil (18, 0.14)  
El Salvador  (17, 0.19) 
Jamaica (19, 0.20)  
Korea, Rep. (18, 0.24)  
Lesotho (18, 0)  
Mauritius (20, 0.16)  
Mongolia (20, 0.07)  
Russian Federation (17, 0.12)  
Switzerland (20, 0.16) 
61 Countries 
Source:  Polity IV and Heinsz (2002a) 
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  Low Constraints  0.25  High Constraints 
 




Expropriation  Risk  4.31 
Transfer Risk 5.76 
 
Expropriation  Risk  4 






Expropriation  Risk  2.78 
Transfer Risk  3.8 
 
Expropriation  Risk  2.18 
Transfer Risk  3.25 
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OECD  Yes Yes Yes No  No  No 
N  128 128 128 100 100 100 
PseudoR2  0.32 0.31 0.32 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Note:  Ordered probit with robust (Huber-White) standard errors.    T-statistics in parentheses. 
***=p<0.01 
  **=p<0.05 
    *=p<0.10 
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Predicted Values from Model 1 (Democracy) 
Risk Category  Min to Mean Dem  Mean to Max Dem 
1 (Lowest Risk)  0.090  0.080 
2 0.119  0.048 
3 0.112  -0.007 
4 -0.160  -0.097 
5 -0.137  -0.023 
6 -0.025  -0.002 
7 (Highest Risk)     
 
Predicted Values from Model 2 (Pol Con) 
Risk Category  Min to Mean Pol Con  Mean to Max Pol Con 
1 (Lowest Risk)  0.185  0.184 
2 0.074  0.073 
3 -0.045  -0.044 
4 -0.178  -0.177 
5 -0.033  -0.034 
6 -0.003  -0.003 
7 (Highest Risk)     
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OECD Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
N 82 82 82 76 76 76 
PseudoR2  0.36 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.36 
Note:  Ordered probit with robust (Huber-White) standard errors.  T-statistics in parentheses.     
***=p<0.01 
  **=p<0.05 
    *=p<0.10 
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Predicted Values from Model 7 (Democracy) 
Risk Category  Min to Mean Const  Mean to Max Const 
1 (Lowest Risk)  0.000  0.000 
2 0.013  0.013 
3 0.024  0.013 
4 0.037  0.006 
5 -0.031  -0.023 
6 -0.043  -0.010 
7 (Highest Risk)     
 
Predicted Values from Model 8 (Pol Con) 
Risk Category  Min to Mean Const  Mean to Max Const 
1 (Lowest Risk)  0.001  0.006 
2 0.034  0.086 
3 0.052  0.072 
4 0.067  0.013 
5 -0.085  -0.137 
6 -0.069  -0.040 
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  43Appendix: 
Independent Variables 
 
Variable Description  Year  Source 
GDPPC  Log of GDP Per Capita (PPP)   2002  WDI 2004 
Growth  GDP Growth   2002  WDI 2004 
Aid  Foreign Aid (% GDP)  2002  WDI 2004 
Democracy  0-20 Polity Score  2002  Jaggers and Gurr 
Pol Con  Political Constraints  2001  Henisz 2002b 
Debt  Present Value of Debt  (%GDP)  2002  WDI 2004 
Reserves  Reserves (months of imports)  2002  WDI 2004 
OECD  Dummy for OECD Country  2002  OECD.org 
 
  44Investment Insurance and Arbitration Center Interviews 
 
N o .   O r g a n i z a t i o n         B u s i n e s s   D a t e  
1  Export Development Canada (Ottawa)     Insurance  6/11/04 
2  Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (D.C.)    Insurance  7/21/04 
3  Overseas Private Investment Corporation (New York)*    Insurance  8/24/04 
4  Internal Centre for Investment Disputes (D.C.)      Arbitration  1/04/05 
5  The Belgium Export Credit Agency (Brussels)**    Insurance  6/06/05 
6  Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (DC)     Insurance  5/18/05 
7  Kiln’s  (London)        Insurance  5/23/05 
8  Chubb  (London)      Insurance  5/24/05 
9  Berne  Union  (London)       Insurance    5/24/05 
10  Singapore International Arbitration Centre (Singapore)    Arbitration  6/28/05 
11  Aon Risk Services (Hong Kong)          Insurance          6/20/05 
12  Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (Hong Kong)  Arbitration  7/04/05 
13  Zurich Emerging Market Solution (Hong Kong)     Insurance   7/04/05 
14  Gerling Allgemeine Versicherungs (Hong  Kong)    Insurance    7/04/05 
 
Consultants, Law Firms, and MNE Interviews 
 
N o .   O r g a n i z a t i o n         B u s i n e s s   D a t e  
15  Citigroup  (Brazil)       Finance   3/17/04 
16  UBS  (Brazil)        Finance   3/20/04 
17  Alcan  (Canada)        Production  6/10/04 
18  IBM-Plant Location International  (Brussels)*    Consulting  6/29/04 
19  BG  Consulting  (D.C.)       Consulting  7/02/04 
20  Intel  (Costa  Rica)       Production  7/29/04 
21  Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz (D.C.)  Legal    8/11/04 
22  US Commercial Service (Vietnam)        Government  6/22/05 
23  PhillipsFox  (Vietnam)       Legal   6/22/05 
24  Economic Development Board (Singapore)    Government  6/28/05 
25  Intel  (Vietnam)*      Services 6/29/05 
26  Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer  (Hong  Kong)    Legal   6/30/05 
27  PepsiCo  (Vietnam)*       Production  7/06/05 
28  Jones  Day  (Shanghai)       Legal   7/08/05 
 
Notes: 
*    Phone Interview 
**  Email Exchange 
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